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From June 2004 to July 2006, the Federal Open Market
Committee raised the target federal funds rate in 17 consecutive meetings,
taking it from 1 percent to 5.25 percent. The puzzling feature of this round
of monetary tightening is that long-term interest rates didn’t increase as
much as they did in previous tightening cycles. In fact, long-term rates
declined most of 2004 and 2005, despite the steady increases in short-term
rates. In 2005, former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan charac-
terized this divergence in the path of short- and long-term rates as a
“conundrum.” 
Recent declines in long-term rates aren’t a phenomenon peculiar
to the United States. Over the past few years, long-term rates around the
In most industrialized
nations, central bankers
have direct control over
short-term interest 
rates and use 
them as their main 
policy instrument.2
world have exhibited similar declining
patterns, reaching lows unseen in the
past 25 years (Chart 1). Economists
have offered a variety of explanations
for this, but the trend has spread
across so many countries that a good
number of analysts now suspect glob-
alization may be playing a key role in
decoupling short- and long-term inter-
est rates. Recent decades have seen
globalization proceed at a rapid pace,
tying nations’ economies closer
together through the freer movement
across borders of goods, services,
money and ideas. This has brought
important changes in the forces that
determine interest rates. 
Monetary policy’s effects on the
economy stem largely from how long-
term interest rates respond to central
banks’ actions. In most industrialized
nations, central bankers have direct
control over short-term interest rates
and use them as their main policy
instrument. When central banks raise
short-term rates, it usually leads to
increases in market-determined long-
term rates, including those for mort-
gages and commercial loans. Higher
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past experience. For instance, during
the last round of monetary tightening
a decade ago, the 10-year Treasury
yield rose by about 1.5 percentage
points, while the target fed funds rate
rose 3 percentage points from January
1994 to February 1995 (Chart 2B). A
simple correlation analysis suggests
that over the two decades up to mid-
2004, a 1 percentage point increase in
the target fed funds rate was accom-
panied by, on average, a 0.3 percent-
















Long-Term Rates Fall Worldwide
Percent
NOTE: Data are monthly.
SOURCE: Haver Analytics.
long-term rates curb aggregate con-
sumption and investment, ultimately
helping contain inflation. Cutting
short-term rates, on the other hand,
usually leads to lower long-term rates,
providing a stimulus for economic
activity. Any lasting changes in the
links between short- and long-term
rates will thus have important implica-
tions for the timing and impact of
monetary policy actions.
Long Rates’ Recent Behavior 
The conventional relationship
between short- and long-term interest
rates appears to have broken down in
the most recent round of monetary
tightening. Although the target federal
funds rate has been gradually rising
over the past two years, the 10-year
Treasury yield remains about where it
was in mid-2004 (Chart 2A). Indeed,
during the first year and a half of the
monetary tightening—June 2004 to
December 2005—the 10-year Treasury
yield fell by about a quarter percent-
age point despite a 3.25 point increase 
in the target fed funds rate.
This pattern contrasts sharply with
Chart 2
Interest Rates Behave
























































Treasury yield. If such a relationship
had persisted, the 4.25 percentage
point increase in the target fed funds
rate over the past two years would
have led to a 1.3 percentage point rise
in the 10-year Treasury yield. In other
words, the 10-year Treasury yield
would have risen to more than 6 per-
cent, instead of hovering around 5
percent.
With short-term rates steadily ris-
ing from a very low starting level and
long-term rates steady, the yield curve
no longer exhibits its normal upward
slope; instead, it has become almost
flat or even inverted (Chart 3). In the
past, a flattening yield curve had been
a good indicator of recessions. The
yield curve inverted eight times during
the past half century, and the U.S.
economy ended up in recession seven
times.1
Lacking a clear understanding of
the new relationship between short-
and long-term rates, many investors
rely on history and interpret today’s
inverted yield curve as a harbinger of
economic slowdown or recession.
This time, however, the overall econo-
my looks strong, making the recent
behavior of long-term interest rates a
puzzle worth solving. 
Explaining the Low Bond Yields
Several studies analyzing the
bond rate conundrum have shown
that the recent declines in long-term
yields are unlikely to be a sign of an
impending recession. Instead, they’re
more likely a reflection of several fun-
damental changes in the macroecono-
my and financial markets—most
notably, increasing globalization.2
In principle, bond yields are the
product of two main components—
one related to real returns and the
other to inflation (see box). The first
component is the real interest rate,
which compensates lenders for forgo-
ing consumption now in return for the
promise of future consumption. This
promise inherently has two parts—risk
and return—that stem from different
sources, making it useful to split them
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS EconomicLetter
Determining Bond Yields: A Primer
The following equation sums up the factors that determine the interest rate on bonds:
R = r + λr + π
e+ λπ,
where R is the long-term bond yield, r is the expected real interest rate, λr is the real
rate risk premium, π
e is expected inflation, and λπ is the inflation risk premium. Each
of these factors stems from a potentially different source, and thus each should be
explained to clearly delineate the reasons interest rates can be high or low.
The decline in bond yields (R) over the past 2
1⁄2 decades has come from reductions in
all four factors. Expected inflation (π
e) has fallen from about 10 percent in the early
1980s to roughly 2.5 percent today, and the inflation risk premium (λπ) is down from
about 3 percent in the early 1980s to less than 1 percent today. The real interest rate
component (r + λr) is also lower, likely due to a fall in both the expected real rate (r)
and the real rate risk premium (λr). Improved monetary policy, a more stable real
economy, the development of deeper and more integrated global financial markets,
and a global savings glut have brought lower long-bond yields virtually worldwide.
Globalization has contributed to each of these factors.
r : The real interest rate
Sometimes called the riskless real
rate, this part of R  compensates
lenders for postponing consumption
to the future, under full certainty that
the terms of the loan will be honored.
+
λr : The real rate risk premium
This part of R compensates lenders
for the risk that the loan will not be
repaid or will suffer capital loss in the
event of early redemption.
+
π
e : Expected inflation
This part of R compensates lenders
for the expected loss of money’s pur-
chasing power owing to the antici-
pated rise in the price of goods and
services.
+
λπ : Inflation risk premium
This part of R compensates lenders
for the risk that inflation will be higher
than expected, in which case the
principal and interest returned will
have less purchasing power than
anticipated.






componentGlobalization and Real 
Interest Rates
Despite a recent run-up, interest
rates on 10-year Treasury Inflation-
Protected Securities (TIPS) are about 2
percentage points below their early
2000 levels (Chart 4). The decline is
likely related to the decreased volatil-
ity in real economic activity, as reflect-
ed in the deviations from trend
growth rates of GDP and its three
major components—goods, services
and structures (Chart 5). Since the
mid-1980s, fluctuations in real GDP
growth have declined roughly 35 per-
cent from levels seen during the 1950s
to 1970s.3 Spending on goods, services
and structures is far less volatile than
it once was. Additionally, there has
been a long-run shift of America’s
economic base from highly cyclical,
goods-producing industries to more
stable services. This “great modera-
tion”—to borrow a phrase Fed
Chairman Ben Bernanke used in
2005—has helped investors become
more confident about future economic
stability, justifying lower risk premiums.
The substantial decline in macro-
economic volatility is largely, but not
entirely, rooted in domestic factors.
Globalization may have also played a
role. When economies are more inter-
dependent, booms and busts may
become muted as excess demands in
one part of the globe are filled by
excess supplies in other parts, and
vice versa. The economy’s equilibrat-
ing mechanism can dampen local
shocks better when connected to a
large market of diversified sectors with
integrated flows of goods, services,
financial capital and people than
when the shock must be borne entire-
ly locally. By helping stabilize the
business cycle and enhance investors’
confidence about future economic sta-
bility, globalization reduces the real
component of long-term rates and
thus cuts risk premiums.
At the same time, the available
pool of world savings has increased
significantly—what Bernanke has
called the “global saving glut.” It has
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apart conceptually and observe, if
possible, the behavior of each.
First, the expected real rate
(sometimes called the riskless real
rate) is the interest required to
reward lending under full certainty
that the loan agreement will be hon-
ored. It equilibrates the market
demand for and supply of loanable
real funds. Because the borrower
may default or either party may need
to exit the contract prematurely
(leading to possible capital loss),
however, lenders also require a risk
premium. It reflects the degree of
uncertainty, stemming primarily from
volatility in the underlying real econ-
omy (business cycle swings).
The second component is infla-
tion related and derives from the fact
that contracts are made in terms of
money, not goods and services. As a
result, investors must be compensat-
ed for the inflation they expect and
the risk that inflation won’t be what
they anticipated. 
High inflation can severely erode
the purchasing power of nominal
interest payments on bonds and the
principal repayment upon maturity.
For this reason, bond yields tend to
be lower when inflation is tame.
Similarly, when inflation volatility is
low, investors will be more confident
about receiving the real value of
their expected nominal returns and
will require lower premiums for
bearing the risk of future inflation.
Financial markets aggregate
these four forces. Changes in any
one of them will push interest rates
up or down. When inflation uncer-
tainty or expectations recede, for
example, borrowing costs fall, reflect-
ing increased confidence in price sta-
bility. When the economy becomes
more stable or the supply of loanable
funds expands relative to demand,
real borrowing costs decline as well.
Over the past two decades, both the
real and inflation components have
contributed to holding down long-
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Chart 4
Interest Rates on Inflation-
Indexed Securities Lower
Percent
SOURCES: FAME Database; Federal Reserve Board.deficits (Chart 6). With the develop-
ment of deeper and more integrated
global financial markets, the savings
flows from these developing countries
were freely directed to the U.S. and
other advanced nations, helping keep
long-term real interest rates there low.
Globalization and Inflation
Bond yields’ inflation-related
components have also moved lower
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in recent years. U.S. inflation has been
trending downward over the past two
decades, as measured by the Consumer
Price Index and Core Personal
Consumption Expenditures Price Index
(Core PCEPI). Similar declines show up
in measures of one-year-ahead and
long-run inflation expectations (Chart
7).4 Both actual and expected inflation
have gradually fallen from around 10
percent in the early 1980s to about 2 to
2.5 percent today. 
The trend toward lower inflation
has been a worldwide phenomenon,
with prices in most other industrial-
ized countries behaving much as they
have in the U.S. Among the seven
largest industrial nations, average
annual inflation has fallen from 10
percent in 1973–83 to less than 2 per-
cent in the past decade (Chart 8). The
sustained and widespread decline in
inflation has put significant downward
pressure on long-term bond yields in
both advanced and emerging-market
economies. 
Inflation volatility and the infla-
tion risk premium on long-term
brought additional loanable funds to
increasingly open markets, helping
hold down real interest rates world-
wide. Several factors have contributed
to the savings increase: the revenues
surge of oil and commodity exporters,
the rapid income growth of high-sav-
ing East Asian households, increases
in the foreign exchange reserves held
by East Asian central banks and Latin
American countries’ reduced fiscal
Chart 5
Real GDP Components Show Less Volatility
NOTE: Volatility is measured by deviations from trend rates of growth.
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Chart 6
Saving Rates in 
Emerging-Market
Economies Rise
Savings as a percentage of GDP
Percent
SOURCE: World Development Indicators, World Bank.Treasury bonds have both retreated
over the past two decades (Chart 9).5
Greater price stability has led to a sub-
stantial reduction in the inflation risk
perceived by investors, and, as a con-
sequence, both inflation premiums
and long-term bond yields are lower.
Money has become more interna-
tionally mobile over the past two
decades. Cross-border bond and equi-
ty transactions now exceed $90 trillion
a year, and the total value of global
financial markets has reached $118
trillion, three times global GDP.6
Financial market integration has effec-
tively increased potential competition
among national currencies, significant-
ly contributing to the low and stable
inflation that produces greater stability
of long-term bond yields around the
world.7
Many nations once imposed rigid
controls that hindered foreigners’ abili-
ty to invest in the country and kept
their citizens from investing abroad.
Now, capital is less likely to be held
captive to nationality. In a globalized
world with highly mobile capital, it is
much easier for investors to convert
their assets into other nations’ curren-
cies should they become concerned
about the inflation risk of their local
money. Currency competition forces
national governments to discipline
their economic policies and pursue
price stability.
The conventional wisdom, of
course, still holds: Inflation is largely a
monetary phenomenon. But nations
have resorted to various methods to
enforce the monetary discipline
required in an era of globalization.
Since the early 1990s, central banks in
a number of countries—among them,
the U.K., New Zealand, Canada,
Sweden and Australia—have adopted
an inflation-targeting approach to
monetary policy, making clear their
priority is to maintain price stability.
Setting an explicit target has substan-
tially enhanced the banks’ credibility.
Inflation volatility and the perceived
inflation risk have declined substan-
tially in those countries. Even in the
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Chart 7
Actual and Expected U.S. Inflation Trend Downward
Percent
NOTE: Data are monthly.
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Chart 8
Declining Inflation Seen Around the World
Percent
SOURCES: Haver Analytics. U.S. and other nations that haven’t
explicitly set numeric targets, central
banks’ efforts to restrain inflation have
decreased its average level and volatil-
ity, thereby strengthening investors’
confidence in long-run price stability.
Globalization’s influence on infla-
tion isn’t limited to money and finan-
cial markets. Increased international
competition in product and labor mar-
kets has also contributed to price sta-
bility. With goods, services and infor-
mation crossing borders more readily
than ever, producers are forced to
match foreign competitors’ prices and
quality by increasing productivity and
decreasing costs. Greater factor mobil-
ity has also helped lower costs and
inflation around the world because it
allows labor and capital to flow more
freely toward centers of comparative
advantage, where they can be their
most productive.
Globalization has reduced long-
term interest rates and made long-
term lending instruments more substi-
tutable internationally. It has done so
in three ways: by reducing the level
and volatility of inflation across many
nations, by helping stabilize the busi-
ness cycle and reduce investors’
uncertainty regarding future economic
shocks, and by encouraging the devel-
opment of deeper, more integrated
global financial markets that help
direct loanable funds into a common
pool. The upshot is a higher interest
elasticity of bond demand than exist-
ed in yesterday’s more insular world.
Monetary Policy Implications 
Today, investors have greater
opportunity to choose from among a
globally diverse range of assets. As
domestic and foreign financial instru-
ments become more substitutable,
each country’s interest rates—in par-
ticular, the medium- to long-term
maturities—will be determined more
by global influences and less by
domestic factors. Central banks’ ability
to affect long-term rates may be
severely eroded, as we have seen in
the recent “conundrum” period. 
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Consequently, the effects of mon-
etary policy tightening or loosening
may be substantially weakened.
Because long rates are less sensitive
to short rates, the response of aggre-
gate demand to monetary policy
moves may prove sluggish. One
example is the lack of response in the
mortgage and housing markets in
2004 and early 2005, when homebuy-
ers’ borrowing costs changed little as
the Federal Reserve tightened. Low
rates kept the housing boom in high
gear, stimulating sales and providing
builders with incentives to expand
operations despite the Fed’s attempt
to slow the economy.
Globalization’s impact on the
relationship between short- and long-
term interest rates poses potentially
formidable challenges for central
banks around the world. It under-
scores the importance of formulating
monetary policy in a credible, consis-
tent and forward-looking way and
better communicating it to the public.
Adopting these virtues will help
anchor long-run inflationary expecta-
tions and decrease associated risk pre-
miums. It will also help the public
better understand central banks’
behavior and decrease the perceived
uncertainty of future monetary policy.
Globalization may also call for greater
cooperation and coordination of policy
worldwide because international finan-
cial conditions increasingly affect the
price of credit in all major countries.
New economic realities and rela-
tionships have challenged the basic
assumptions of monetary policy in the
past. Two decades ago, for example, a
strategy of relying on monetary aggre-
gates proved ineffective, leading the
Fed to shift its primary policy focus to
actual inflation and capacity measures.
Now, just as then, a deeper under-
standing of the factors in play will
allow central bankers to achieve their
mandate of non-inflationary economic
growth. 
Wu is a senior economist in the Research
Department of the Federal Reserve Bank of
Dallas.
















Less Inflation Volatility Leads to Lower Risk Premiums
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NOTE: Data are monthly.
SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics.Notes
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three-month and 10-year Treasury bonds.
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ed at the 13th Bank of Japan International
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3 This is according to calculations found in the
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More Stable? A Bayesian Approach Based on a
Markov-Switching Model of the Business
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also in “Output Fluctuations in the United
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4 The one-year-ahead inflation expectation is the
year-ahead CPI inflation expectation from the
Blue Chip survey, and the long-run inflation
expectation is the 10-year inflation expectation
from the Survey of Professional Forecasters.
5 The inflation volatility in Chart 9 is measured
by the five-year trailing standard deviation of
the annual CPI inflation. The inflation premium
on a five-year Treasury bond is calculated using
a no-arbitrage-based term structure model. 
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State and Metro Employment Data
Revised early in advance of Texas Workforce Commission
Business-Cycle Indexes
Monitor economic activity in Texas and its major metros
Texas Leading Index
Predicts economic activity in the state
Beige Book
Reports anecdotal comments on current economic conditions
Texas Manufacturing Outlook Survey
Assesses current conditions and outlook, including output, 
employment, prices and inventories
Texas Industrial Production Index
Measures monthly changes in overall manufacturing, 
mining and utilities
Survey of Agricultural Credit Conditions
Presents bankers’ insights into agricultural lending and land values
Find these data and more at www.dallasfed.org.
E-mail alerts available
Your Source for Regional Economic Indicators